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Abstract: From a behaviorist 
perspective, the desire to upload 
“minds” is already being realized on a 
mass, hyper-industrial scale thanks to 
the convergence of cognitive computing 
and Big Data. The accusation is that the 
“mind” is not an entity that exists 
intracranially. Instead, it is conceived as 
a process of individuation, which occurs 
in different modes and numbers. Some 
narratives of mind-uploading and 
technics in popular culture are 
explored: Transcendence (2014, dir. 
Wally Pfister) and Player Piano by Kurt 
Vonnegut. The discussed issues 
consider Bernard Stiegler’s 
phenomenological notion of originary 
default and Thierry Bardini’s analysis of 
junk. Several questions are raised 
regarding miscalculations, accidents, in 
addition to Nicolas Agar’s discussion on 
the end of humanity, and Daniel 
Dennett’s Multiple Drafts theory within 
the context of exteriorization, which is 
considered as constitutive of interiority. 
Keywords: Homo Nexus, Mind-
Uploading, Data Behaviorism, 
Psychoinformatics, Post-Humanism, 
Alienability 
Abstrakt: Z perspektywy 
behawiorystów, postulat uploadowania 
„umysłów” jest już realizowany na 
masową, hiper-przemysłową skalę 
dzięki inteligentnego przetwarzania 
dużego i różnorodnego zbioru danych. 
Następuje nawiązania do argumentu, że 
„umysł” nie jest bytem, który istnieje 
wewnątrzczaszkowo. Raczej jest on 
pojmowany jako proces indywiduacji, 
który przebiega w różnych trybach 
i w różnych ilościach. Przeanalizowane 
są niektóre z występujących w kulturze 
popularnej narracji o wczytywaniu 
umysłu do komputerów i o technice: 
Transcendencja (2014, reż. Wally 
Pfister) oraz Pianola Kurta Vonneguta. 
Poruszane zagadnienia uwzględniają 
fenomenologiczne pojęcie originary 
default Bernarda Stieglera oraz junk 
Thierry’ego Bardiniego. Kilka wątków 
związanych zostało z pomyłkami, 
przypadkami, a także z dyskusją 
Nicolasa Agara na temat końca 
człowieka i teorią Multiple Drafts 
Daniela Dennetta w kontekście 
eksterioryzacji, która traktowana jest 
jako konstytutywna dla wnętrza. Słowa 








I claim that the question of mind-uploading is posed incorrectly. Suppose 
we accept the methodological behaviorist paradigm and, in addition, 
consider the “mind” as Derek Melser proposes, i.e., the covert tokening of 
the overt tokening of concerted activity (2004, p. 56), together with the 
context of Big Data. In that case, we could claim that we are already 
uploading minds to data networks. For most users, this is a process that is 
underway without a proper understanding of the situation, so without 
genuine consent. Contemporary industrial mind uploading is being 
developed today by complex new data behaviorism (Rouvroy, 2013) 
powered by psychoinformatics (Montag, Duke, and Markowetz, 2016; 
Gupta et al., 2018). User profiles are models of the patterns of observable 
gestures and actions measured, recorded, stored, and processed. Such 
systematic network behaviorism creates digital doppelgangers that are a 
sort of copy of users’ minds for the sake of predictability and the 
reduction of risk, the singular, through hyper-synchronization. What is 
worrisome is the priority of increasing the speed of commercial access to 
brains within such an industrial context (Stiegler, 2014, 2015). Moreover, 
an essential part of our identity is nonidentical, such as how information 
and noise are relevant to each other, where what I cannot understand is 
constitutive of knowledge itself. For example, I can never know the time 
of my death, which is the most fundamental Heideggarian nonknowledge 
for Dasein.  
Technology, junk, chaos, mistakes, and story-telling profoundly involve 
and bind the relationships of individuation amongst the singular, dual, 
and plural collective selves and non-selves and their proper milieux for 
making sense, including the aesthetic and sensible environment of the 
noetic and sensorial. Through exosomatic organogenesis (Stiegler, 2017) 
or exteriorization, the other constitutes the selfsame—inalienability 
characteristically involves alienability. To phrase it in a catchier way: we 
human beings are always more our accidents than our choice (Marquard, 




deliberately unforeseeable accidents, or the defaults of making decisions 
in the form of behavioral choice architecture, or else their alienization qua 
routine (Ariely, 2009).  
Such phenomena would ensue an exteriorization and grammatization of 
will itself, as controlled losses of control – like the famous Jarocin Festival 
in communist Poland, which supposedly functioned like a safety valve 
(Karendał, 2014, p. 51). Today, such a safety-valve in the times of data 
behaviorism demands the exteriorization of what Kant calls the faculties 
of judgment, their automatization and predictability, which also brings 
the threat of the proletarianization of will, which the climate crisis of the 
Anthropocene, i.e., Capitalocene or Entropocene, exemplifies (Stiegler, 
2018; Internation Collective, 2020). In this sense, mind-uploading is an 
intensification of the loss of all kinds of knowledge, hyper-
proletarianization, since it presupposes the loss of the unpredictable, 
given that the automated cognizant mind is subordinated to out-of-body 
control, a performative project based on misleading assumptions about 
identity (Mróz, 2019a). However, it is essential to note that 
automatization is a condition of autonomy, or dis-automatization, not its 
loss.  
Before we learn to identify ourselves, we need to adhere to an identifying 
being, locate it. The only way this is possible is by anticipating it, 
projecting it. As a perception, this is a kind of hallucination. In other 
words, the self does not exist, but as Bernard Stiegler would say, it 
consists; it is a Husserlian eidos, and it is always inadequate, at least up to 
the moment of death. Stiegler argues that we cannot measure or see what 
we do not already expect (2011). Keeping this in mind, we can follow 
Dominic Pettman in Human Error, who asks and replies: “where is the 
human? […] wherever there is a constitutive technology of self-recognition. 
Whether that technology is a camera, a gun, a broken-in horse, a wife, or 
the U.S. Constitution itself matter less than the capacity to register, record, 
and transmit this recognition” (Pettman, 2011, p. 52). We may add 
language, DNA or “junk DNA” (Bardini, 2011, p. 7) to this list with which 




modes (biologically, post-biologically, and institutionally) which in 
Pettman’s argumentation would be another part of the Anthropological 
Machine. 
For Giorgio Agamben, the primary motor in this autogenetic, 
narcissistic narrative of humanity is the “anthropological 
machine”: an abstract apparatus comprising of all those potent 
symbols, figures, and trope of belonging and exclusion. […] it 
sorts the humans from the nonhuman, subhuman, 
inhuman,post-human, and so on. For Agamben, the crucial 
component of the machine is the way its optics have been rigged 
(in both senses) to encourage self-reflection and nurture a sense 
of exceptionalism and superiority by virtue of one’s proper 
humanness. 
(Pettman, 2011, p. 8) 
The Anthropological Machine intensifies diffraction through which the 
selves pass in their co-constitution, a vanity mirror for the human species 
where the spectacle to behold would be our dispersed and alien minds. It 
is a circumstance of alien semantics, i.e., a hyper-virus. (Bardini, 2011, p. 
179). At the same time, Nicholas Agar affirms that “[…] there is no 
consensus on what it means to be human” (2010, p. 19). We cannot 
distinctly locate ourselves in mode and number, just only reduced to 
ontological minds embodied in flesh. Furthermore, we may accent that 
humanity has no exclusive access to technologies or feelings since they 
are observed in the animal world. In addition, the work Vampyrotheuthis 
Infernalis is a hybrid mirror, where we see that humans, like squid, live as 
functions of their objects (Flusser and Bec, 2012, p. 63; Winnicott, 2016). 
According to Pettman, a cybernetic triangle of human, animal, and 
machine (2011, p. 5) articulates that we are sites, the traces we leave 
behind, or what Stiegler describes in terms of tertiary retentions. Mind-
uploading, transhumanist story-telling attempts to personify the 
Anthropological Machine by excluding location, the biological, 
incorporating only the post-biological, abstract, and incidentally, the 




The body is sight and site, we know as representation, even 
when we fix our gaze on the three-dimensional breathing body 
of the self or the other, in that we “consider” the data recorded 
by the retina via language, whether spoken or silent, and 
language is, perforce, representation (and not reality). 
(Leppert, 1995, p. xx) 
Whatever the case may be, the mind most certainly is a case of mistaken 
identity. Humans attribute a great deal of effort in trying to understand 
the concept of consciousness, even as a hallucination as Daniel Dennett 
attempts to address via heterophenomenology, in which the processes 
and counter-processes of consciousness are misrepresented, perhaps, by 
cognitivism, i.e., as reduced to something finite, computational (Stiegler, 
no date). Nonetheless, in terms of the Heideggerian Sein zum Tode, or the 
fear of death, proponents of what Agar describes as post-humanist radical 
enhancements wish to continue infinite sentient life after death (Mróz, 
2019a). They have the right spirit, a vital attitude, which continuously 
struggles to make a différance: reverse, deflect, delay, and defer entropy. 
However, as thermodynamics dictates, negentropy and anti-entropy can 
only be temporary and localized processes. Set forward by Ray Kurzweil, 
the idea of mind-uploading is an attempt at prolonging mental existence 
indefinitely and through a calculated order, but such a fantastic attempt 
towards out-of-body mental experiences forgets and leaves behind all 
out-of-order experience. Such systematic exteriorization orthopraxically 
valorizes the junk-ridden and ironically excludes anything incalculable or 
unmeasurable – the methodological behaviorist definition of the mind – 
and the unfortunate, the alien, and experiences of the flesh, including dis-
ease and dis-comfort (Mróz, 2019b).  
 
In 2014, Johnny Depp starred in the film Transcendence, directed by Wally 
Pfister, as an academic hero, Dr. Will Caster, confronted by the immediate 




scientist’s life, his significant other and colleagues connected his brain to a 
quantum computer that would create a digital copy of the patterns of his 
consciousness in the informatic universe of software and hardware. The 
mind-upload was a success. The uploaded mind of Caster then grew 
beyond limitation by orchestrating the actions of others to create an 
environment hospitable to its post-humanistic being. In the end, humanity 
was hostile, terrified, and awe-struck by its complexity and 
supercomputer tactics. The effects of such modeling are much less 
exciting today, and the algorithms described by Cathy O’Neil are already 
replicating the past as the future in systematically negative ways, 
bypassing the infinity of knowledge (2017). Returning to the movie, 
humans formed a plan to destroy the post-upload and out-of-control 
Caster by sending a virus. The plot ends in a tragedy reminiscent of the 
Shakespearian Romeo and Juliet. Caster’s digital mind sacrifices itself by 
encountering its virus-infected romantic partner; both are united in 
death. Still, a part of it (or them) remains in an isolated part of their 
garden, leaving the viewer to fill in the gaps. 
Ray Kurzweil could be considered the real-world counterpart of Caster 
(obviously in desire, not in fact). The primary fantasy of mind-uploading 
would be eternal life resulting from reaching The Singularity, a concept of 
a utopian next-gen existence, where the corpus of such a mind would be 
the entire matter and energy of the existing universe. Kurzweil points out 
that mind-uploading may be more gradual than depicted by the film 
Transcendence. It would be achieved by neuroprosthesis, the like of which 
Elon Musk is currently developing with NeuraLink. The idea is to replace 
non-computational components with computational ones part by part, 
passing from the biological to the post-biological. The mythology of 
Hephaestus, the god affected by default and master of automatons and 
motion, comes to mind. The fact that he is married to Aphrodite, who is 
drawn to the god of war, is significant for technics and desire. The 
enigmas of mind-uploading boil down to the possibility and infinite 
desirability of a future, which would be jeopardized by its short-circuiting, 




Agar claims that mind-uploading will most definitely be a radical 
existential change. It would be a situation, where we in biological terms, 
exit the species of Homo Sapiens. Perhaps a new post-biological species 
would follow, such as Homo Nexus (Bardini, 2011, p. 145) or Homo Deus 
(Harari, 2019). Nevertheless, it is challenging to attribute irrational traits 
to hardware and software. Perhaps we would be dealing with a new 
branch of life itself, that is if it could be classified as life, or what Stiegler 
calls the pursuit of life through the non-living. Furthermore, Agar argues 
that the post-human would “neither [be] capable of thinking like human 
brains, nor indeed of entertaining a single thought.” (Agar, 2010, p. 39). 
We could say that this absence of thought would be due to the originary 
default of thought (Stiegler, 1998a, 1998b).  
In addition, there is a hope, part of Agar’s following argument, that “the 
uploaded mind would be more of an upgrade than a copy” (Agar, 2010, p. 
40). This argument takes into account the fact that energy travels faster in 
electric circuits than in biochemical wirings. Modern decision-making 
software travels at the speed of light, while human thought slogs on 
painfully slow. Such high-techne is implemented in places such as Wall 
Street. As Stiegler frequently points out about the 2008 Financial Crisis 
and Alan Greenspan’s confession that no one understood why this 
happened, proletarianization is a universal effect of hyper-
industrialization. 
Furthermore, Agar argues that mind uploading equates with death itself, 
depending on technological advances. We could add that the Kurzweilian 
singularity would rather be a situation of entropic hyper-deindividuation, 
a hastening of the processes drifting towards the most probable 
distribution of matter and energy, hyper-entropy. It is also worth recalling 
that Shannon’s definition of information is formulated based on entropy.  
Furthermore, John Searle’s Wager (parallel to Pascal’s Wager) considers 
existential death if weak AI is the destination of our uploaded minds of 
their former destroyed brains. The technological possibilities seem to be 




especially considering that holistic behaviorism considers the body and 
mind as one (Sybilski, 2007, p. 11), notably in terms of non-cranial 
cognition. All in all: “Uploading requires not only a completed 
neuroscience – total understanding of what is currently the least well-
understood part of the human body – but also perfect knowledge of how 
to convert every relevant aspect of the brain’s functioning into electronic 
computation” (Agar, 2010, p. 67). The presumption forgets the brain’s 
exteriorization of its computations to other parts of the body, which is 
more like a holobiont, a complex interwoven relationship of alien 
organisms that make up the human organism.  
In Dennett’s heterophenomenological account, he proposes an argument 
for narrative selves, often comparing them to a machine but not 
necessarily suggesting a post-humanistic alternative (but he does take 
robotics as a possibility). Strictly, Dennett is trying to grasp an 
understanding of our human consciousness. According to Multiple Drafts 
Theory, conscious experience results from Darwinian adaptation and the 
aesthetics and carnalities of sexual selection that created the biochemical 
reactions that result in consciousness shared through pandemonic 
thought processing. This account forgets the integral role of technics in 
shaping consciousness, i.e., episteme, as Stiegler argues (Stiegler, 1998a, 
1998b). Many animals from lower branches of evolution have the 
components that we do. In Aristotelean terms, human mental experience 
affects the historical development of vegetative and sensitive souls as 
conditions of the noetic. Consciousness itself is not a continuous 
experience; it is segregated and erratic. Stiegler argues that the same is 
true of the noetic soul, which suffers from noetic regression. Such a 
regression does not equate to the conditions of a sensitive soul, precisely 
because it is a noetic regression, which the French philosopher designates 
as acting-out, and which I would supplement with being hyper-vigilant, or 
acting-in, too much self-control, which is symptomatic of the pathologies 
of what could be called sexual anorexia, or toxic repression of the erotic, 
desire (Carnes and Moriarity, 1997). In this context, we may raise an 




Two or more bodies sharing a single self! There may actually be 
such a case, in York, England: the Chaplin twins, Greta and Freda 
(Time, April 6, 1981). These identical twins, now in their forties 
and living together in a hostel, seem to act as one: they 
collaborate on the speaking of single speech acts, for instance, 
finishing each other’s sentences with ease or speaking in unison, 
with one just a split-second behind 
(Dennett, 1991, p. 422). 
Dennett advances the Chaplin twins as an example in the context of 
Multiple Personality Disorder. Mind-uploading is an ableist concept, and 
there is an undecidable default: which mind would we upload? At the 
moment, it is even more challenging to imagine a computational machine 
that runs simultaneously many operating systems, unless it is a quantum 
computer, but that for now is not a plausible industrial option for mass 
production. And why just humans? Wouldn’t mind-uploading be 
anthropocentric and a form of species chauvinism as well? Any organism 
capable of responding to stimuli must have some dimension of sentience.  
Furthermore, Dennett writes, “a person is not just a body; a person has a 
body. […] The boundaries of Jones are not identical to the boundaries of 
Jones’s body” (Dennett 452). It is part of a belief environment. Identity is 
stuck in being’s web (or becoming as some authors prefer – such as 
Pettman and Bardini) and grounded into realism. 
Suppose consciousness has a body and is part of the world, then 
understanding DNA also is hopeless for mind-uploading as a radical 
enhancement. Why? Because it is a bunch of junk, as argues Bardini, 
98.5% of the DNA we carry is noise and fossilized copies of past viruses, 
bugs, and errors. It may provide some functional creative forces for 
adaptation. However, most of it is not expressed and not researched (only 
the 3% or so is) and are compared to fossils that inhabit the human 
genome – humans share 99.9% genetic identicality, where the 0.1% 
difference is one that evolutionarily matters. From Richard Dawkins’ 




holistic level of being, to virus and retrovirus replication, Bardini presents 
a magnitude of positions, which illustrate the problems of naming things, 
as well as the problems of the identity of the post-human. Homo Nexus is 
the interconnected and networked being, a knot, which modern 
psychoinformatics anticipates within the context of the contemporary 
belief in Data Religion (Harari, 2019). Most of the biofeedback is stuck in a 
loop. Bardini writes: 
Today’s Truth is that nobody know what junk DNA can still hide. 
For Junk DNA is the black matter of the ontogenesis of the 
machine of the fourth kind. The dunce concept that I have in my 
guts is that DNA is a whole unity, and not only by numbers, 
continuous or discontinuous quantity, matter or bare existence. 
That the pre-individual could after all be in each individual; that 
each singular DNA participate in a whole DNA ecology. And all 
living beings are connected by the powers of junk. 
(Bardini 137). 
Despite the difficulties in pinpointing what the becoming we call human 
is, it should be more relevant to retain the integrity of human becoming 
during a mind- upload enhancement; we would need to consider much 
more than just the simple act of neuroprosthetic enhancement. It would 
more likely be a case of mind-uploading the entire universe – if I may go 
out on a limb and make such a radical statement for illustrating the point 
of existential intra-connectedness and the ever-changing paradigms of 
science. 
In the final chapter of Vonnegut’s Player Piano, the despotically 
suppressed dystopian society witnesses a lower-class revolt, an aesthetic 
feeling of disgust against symbolic misery, of humans paradoxically 
revolting due to newfound freedom from labor, which was automatized 
and done by machines. Such a mutiny is an insurrection against 
deindividuation qua being free from doom (Bardini, 2011, p. 131). They 
resist the technocratic and cybernetic performance rules and aims of 




engineers, mostly doctorates coordinating society. The landscape in this 
scene is littered with what Bardini also calls junk, which could be helpful 
but may also be potentially waste, garbage, or trash, increasing evermore 
(Le Brun, 2018). Its potential usefulness is what stops us from tossing it 
into a bin of annihilation. If it would be harmful, then existential prejudice 
would resist its creation (Agar, 2010, p. 175). The reader of Vonnegut’s 
dystopian universe is confronted with an image that includes the normal 
expectations resulting from a violent conflict – lots of bodies and an 
overall mess. The writer accents mostly junk-like rubbish laying within 
ruins: 
In the early light, the town seemed an enormous jewel box, lined 
with the black and gray velvet of fly-ash, and filled with millions 
of twinkling treasures: bits of air conditioners, […], garbage 
disposers, […], transformers, turbines, vacuum cleaners, vacuum 
gauges, vacuum tubes, venders, vibration meters, viscosimeters, 
water heaters, wheels, X-ray spectrogoniometers, zymometers… 
(Vonnegut, 1969, pp. 390–391). 
Celebrating their anticipated victory over mechanization, the crowd 
gathers around an Orange-O Machine to toss in a coin for a sip of its 
product. Then a keen observer notices: 
“But the light behind the Orange-O sign didn’t light up,” said a 
woman. “Supposed to.” 
“We’ll fix that, won’t we, Bud?” said another voice from behind 
the machine. 
“You people get me about three feet of that red wire hanging out 
of the shoeshine machine, and somebody let me borrow their 
penknife a second.”  
The speaker stood up and stretched, and smiled contentedly, 
and Paul recognized him: the tall, middle-aged, ruddy-faced man 
who’d fixed Paul’s car with the sweatband of his hat long ago. 




The fragment above is an eye-witness fictional account of junk coming to 
life, usefulness from necessity, and the fact that it happens to be readily 
available, even if not necessarily constructed or designed for the 
particular usage of repairing an Orange-O light. The following fragment 
would relate Junkware to Agar’s arguments in Humanity’s End, Dennett’s 
heterophenomenological conception of self-narrative, and Pettman’s 
interpretations of The Anthropological Machine and Cybernetic Triangle. 
The story goes on: 
The man had been desperately unhappy then. Now he was 
proud and smiling because his hands were busy doing what they 
liked to do best, Paul supposed – replacing men like himself with 
machines. He hooked up the lamp behind the Orange-O sign. 
“There we are.” 
(Vonnegut, 1969, p. 393). 
Indeed, there we are, as Marquard upholds, humanity as a collective of 
accidents that we could change and those we cannot. We can never truly, 
by choice, make final self-actualized decisions because we are finite 
beings with a limited perspective determined to die. We do not know nor 
understand what we want (Agar, 2010, p. 140). Death, entropy, is a 
necessary default: “by desiring to bring heaven to hell, it is hell that is 
exalted.” (Flusser and Bec, 2012, p. 72). Indeed:  
It is true that all of our political activity is likewise directed 
against our biological condition, against biologically 
predetermined inequalities. The difference is that our 
biologically predetermined inequalities also have a significant 
and overlying cultural component. Our political struggles are 
thus against this cultural superstructure, which we strive to 
rebuild. Moreover, we can imagine cultural structures 
(“Utopias”) with which even our biological constraints are done 
away. 




Likewise, as Vonnegut’s novel concludes, so do I. Even though (as in the 
book) humans have revolted against their degraded, dehumanized and 
alienated, status to machines, in the end, they start to reconstruct the 
society that they have just overturned—starting from simply repairing a 
silly Orange-O machine. Perhaps the fantasies of post-humanity set 
humanity in an analogous condition that will constantly be pushing in 
unexpected directions thanks to “the error, known as focalism” (Agar, 
2010, p. 145).  
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